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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a game-theoretic model of the effects of state and federal income tax 
rates and audit rates on compliance with the federal income tax. Using data drawn primarily from 
the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the years 1977-85, we find 
empirical confirmation of the model's prediction that increases in the tax rates increase compliance. 
We also investigate the overall performance of the federal revenue collection process and find that 
the entire IRS estimate of the increase in individual noncompliance during 1977-85 is more than 
accounted for by the decrease in auditing over the same period. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Although there is much that is admitted to be mysterious about the tax compliance process,
at least one thing tax policy analysts seem to know for sure: lowering income tax rates induces 
greater compliance. This "fact" served as an important justification for the dramatic reduction of the 
top marginal rate from 50 to 28 percent by the Tax Refonn Act of 1986, and has been routinely 
advanced in policy debates by all manner of experts. To take but two typical examples, economists 
Henry Aaron and Harvey Galper in their recent analysis of tax reform advance only two factors 
affecting tax compliance, marginal tax rates and complexity, stating that "the increase in the typical 
marginal tax rate has made tax avoidance increasingly profitable. 1 A different sort of expert, then 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., testifying on the President's tax refonn 
proposals, told the Congress: 
"I believe, personally, that there is a very definite mindset on the part of many taxpayers 
that when the rates reach a particular level, they are going to try to find ways around it, 
whereas [with] the reduction in those rates, more and more of that particular group feel 
that it is not worth it.2 
Commonplace as they are, assertions such as these seem supported more by wishful thinking 
than by either solid theory or hard fact. Indeed, early theoretical work by economists generated 
ambiguous predictions about the effects of tax rate changes on compliance, while more recent 
theoretical work that includes the IRS as an interactive participant in the tax collection process 
suggests that increasing tax rates will actually increase compliance (Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde, 
1986). Empirical evidence on the issue is quite limited and largely unreliable (as discussed in 
Dubin, Graetz and Wilde, 1987). Although we shall report here several empirical findings of interest 
and discuss their policy implications, the basic purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence 
regarding the relationship between tax and audit rates and federal income tax compliance. 
Our theoretical analysis builds on the game-theoretic model due to Graetz, Reinganum and 
Wilde (1986), subsequently generalized in Reinganum and Wilde ( 1986), which includes the tax 
enforcement agency as strategic participant in the revenue collection process. Our empirical 
analysis, based upon state-level data taken mostly from The Annual Reports of the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, confinns the theoretical prediction of the game-theoretic model that increases in 
tax rates increase compliance. This emerges from our analysis of the effect of state tax rates on 
compliance and from testing the effects on compliance of inflation, which has been directly related 
to federal tax rate increases through so-called bracket creep. 3 For example, in the years 1971-8 1 ,  a
period of relatively stable federal income tax rates coupled with substantial inflation, the average tax 
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bracket of individual taxpayers rose from 24.0 to 32. 1 percent. 
In addition, the time-series nature of our data allows us to investigate the overall 
performance of the federal revenue collection process during the last decade. Given it's significance 
in the debates over the 1986 tax reform, we explore, in particular, the relationship between audit 
rates and tax collections by asking what would have happened to total IRS collections from 
individuals had the audit rate remained constant at its 1977 level over the period 1977-85. We 
estimate that total IRS collections would have risen by 47.43 billion dollars in 1985, had the audit 
rate remained constant at its 1977 level, a figure which in fact exceeds the most current IRS estimate 
of the fall in compliance during the same period-33.8 billion dollars per year by 1985 . Although 
changes in collections during the last decade necessarily reflect a variety of other factors-notably 
including the dramatic increases in third-party information reporting and in the IRS's ability to 
match such information to tax return submissions, as well as the substantial new and increased 
penalties enacted by Congress in 198 1  and 1982-this finding confirms the prominence of audit rates 
in the tax compliance process. Our estimates imply that the entire estimated increase in individual 
noncompliance during 1977-85 is more than accounted for by the decrease in auditing over the same 
period, other things equal. These results have obvious and important policy implications, and 
generally confirm an economic approach to tax noncompliance: taxpayers do seem to respond 
rationally, even predictably, to the nature of the tax lottery confronting them. Notwithstanding the 
vocal claims of commentators to the contrary, the integrity of the tax system does not seem to have 
been seriously at risk due to massive shifts in taxpayers' behavior during this time. 4 
We are not only able to estimate the total decrease in IRS collections from individuals due to 
the fall in audit rates over the period 1977-85, but we are also able to separate that estimate into an 
amount attributable to the lost additional tax and penalties that would have been collected directly 
from audits and an amount attributable to general deterrence effects (the decrease in collections from 
taxpayers, whether or not they are audited, who have reported less taxes due in response to the 
decreased likelihood of audit). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical 
analysis that yields our prediction of a positive relationship between tax rates and compliance, 
including the linkage between federal compliance and state tax rates, by developing a game-theoretic 
model that includes both state and federal tax agencies. Section 3 then describes our data and 
estimation procedures. Section 4 presents our results on the relationship of state tax rates and 
inflation rates to federal tax compliance for the years 1977-85, and summarizes other empirical 
results of general interest, including our findings regarding the effect of audit rates on individual tax 
collections. Section 5 concludes by discussing the policy implications of these results. 
2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
The modem economic theory of tax compliance began with Gary Becker's 1968 article on
the economics of crime. In addition to the basic notion that crime could be explained as a rational 
decision based on factors such as probabilities of detection and conviction, punishment levels, 
attitudes towards risk, and the like, the most important aspect of Becker's work was his model of 
criminal behavior, which treated the enforcement and judicial systems as exogenous. A substantial 
theoretical literature devoted to taxpayer behavior developed in the Becker tradition, beginning a few 
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years later with the publication of papers by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973). 
The consensus of this literature is that increasing the probability of audit or the penalty rate for 
underreporting tax liabilities will unambiguously reduce noncompliance, but that little else can be 
said conclusively regarding the effects on noncompliance of other factors such as income or, 
especially, tax rates (see, in particular, Yitzhaki, 1974, or more generally, reviews by Witte and 
Woodbury, 1983; and Cowell, 1985). That this class of models to fails yield an unambiguous 
prediction regarding the effects of tax rates on noncompliance is noteworthy since, as we have 
suggested, one of the most widely held "facts" of tax compliance is that lowering tax rates will 
stimulate increased compliance. 
The problem with models developed in the Becker tradition is that they ignore elements of 
the revenue collection process that need to be incorporated into any reasonable empirical 
specification of a compliance model. In particular, if audit rates and punishment levels are included 
as explanatory variables, some account must be taken of their potential endogeneity. 5 From a 
theoretical point of view, endogenizing audit rates requires formulating a positive model of IRS 
behavior and integrating it with a positive model of taxpayer behavior. 
A game-theoretic model which includes both the IRS and taxpayers was introduced in 
Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and subsequently generalized in Reinganum and Wilde 
(1986). In these models the IRS is assumed to set audit rates to maximize expected total revenue net 
of audit costs, taking as given the reporting strategies of taxpayers. In other words, the IRS is 
assumed not to be able to precommit to particular audit strategies. Tax rates and penalty rates are 
fixed exogenously. Graetz, Reiganum and Wilde predict, in equilibrium, a positive relationship 
between tax rates and compliance. This seemingly counterintuitive result has a natural economic 
explanation. An increase in the tax rate increases the gains to underreporting income, but it also 
increases the expected costs of underreporting income in two ways. First, an increase in the tax rate 
increases the penalty for underreporting since fines are typically proportional to unpaid tax. Second, 
an increase in the tax rate increases the incentives of the IRS to audit since, for a given level of 
underreporting, it increases the total tax and penalty collected given an audit. On balance-at least 
in the model analyzed by Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde-the costs of noncompliance associated 
with an increase in the tax rate outweigh the benefits, so that an increase in the tax rate increases 
compliance. We will refer to this effect as the GRW hypothesis. 
That federal tax rates might be positively related to compliance is an important possibility, 
but, because of its counterintuitive nature, one which requires empirical verification. Moreover, it is 
strongly suggestive of other testible relationships that have important policy consequences. In 
particular, it raises the question whether state income tax rates have a systematic effect on federal 
compliance levels. The existence of such a linkage is not obvious, but the question is especially 
important given the recent efforts of state and federal agencies to coordinate their enforcement 
activities. 
Forty-three of the fifty states currently have income taxes. In all these states there is 
substantial overlap between the information relevant for federal and state income tax computations. 
Direct federal-state relationships are common, and, in fact, many states now "piggy-back" their 
income taxes on the federal tax law. Taxpayers can be expected to coordinate their reports of 
relevant tax items, including, for example, income and deductions, on their federal and state income 
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tax returns, and they likely will perceive there to be a connection between the probability of audit for 
state and federal tax underreporting. Moreover, both state and federal returns are filed subject to the 
threat of penalties for perjury as well as for tax fraud. Taxpayers will rightly expect therefore that 
inconsistencies in their reporting between federal and state returns will increase the risks of 
imposition of the harsher penalties for tax noncompliance that depend on the government's ability to 
prove that the taxpayer's understatements were willfu1.6 It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that a 
strong correlation will exist between taxpayers' underreporting on federal and state returns. 
There is also a direct linkage between the activities of state and federal audit agencies. 
Congress and state legislatures have explicitly provided for exchanges of otherwise confidential tax 
return and other tax infonnation between the states and the IRS "to increase tax revenues and 
taxpayer compliance and reduce duplicate resource expenditures. "7 District directors of the IRS are 
instructed to be personally involved in this state-federal cooperative program and to serve as liaison 
with state tax authorities. The IRS Manual explicitly directs the use of data available from state 
agencies "wherever possible." Tax returns and infonnation reports are "exchanged on a continuing 
basis," including magnetic tape data from the IRS's individual master file.8 In fact, third party 
infonnation reporting for both state and federal purposes may now be accomplished by a single filing 
with the IRS of data in a magnetic media fonnat. Although at the beginning of the Coordination of 
Tax Infonnation program infonnation typically travelled in one direction--from the federal to state 
agencies-in recent years, the flow of infonnation from the states to the IRS has been of 
dramatically increasing importance. In addition, disclosure of federal tax return infonnation to state 
lawyers pursuing tax cases is now governed by the same standards that apply to IRS disclosures to 
attorneys of the federal Department of Justice. 
Agreements on the exchange of tax infonnation also explicitly provide that state tax 
enforcement agencies and the IRS "will develop cooperative return selection and examination 
programs" to avoid duplicative efforts.9 The IRS and cooperating states now routinely, for example, 
synchronize certain audit decisions. Currently 49 states and the District of Columbia have 
agreements on the coordination of tax infonnation and audits with the IRS. 
The model which follows incorporates into the basic game-theoretic model introduced by 
Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde state, as well as federal, tax agencies and coordinated state and federal 
reporting strategies by taxpayers. A relationship between state tax rates and federal compliance 
emerges that is similar to that of the original GRW hypothesis, viz., that an increase in state tax rates 
increases compliance at the federal level. 
In this model income takes one of two values, h or I H, where h <I H. The probability of 
high income is q. Denote IH -h by A. For simplicity assume taxpayers are risk neutral, and all act
strategically; that is, whenever a taxpayer has high income, he reports low income on both his state 
and federal returns with probability p, where p is set to maximize expected net income, allowing for
tax rates, audit probabilities and penalty rates. 
To describe the problems facing the state and federal tax agencies we introduce the 
following notation: 
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Pi = probability of agency i audit given a report of h, i = s, f ; 
qi = probability of agency i audit given agency J audit, i ':/. j; i, j = s ,f; 
ti = proportional tax rate, i = s, f ; 
7ti = penalty rate applied proportionally to evaded tax, i = s, f; and 
ci = cost of agency i audit, i = s, f . 
Tax agencies only audit low income reports. They want to maximize net expected revenue. 
Given Ps, we have for the state tax agency that 
(1) 
where cr = pq /(1 -q + pq ) .
In other words, cr is the probability that a low income report comes from a high income taxpayer who 
has underreported. 
The definition of expected state revenue net of audit costs given in (1) assumes the cost of a 
state audit is zero when it occurs because of a recommendation by the federal tax agency. This 
assumption is stronger than necessary (what is required is that federal cooperation lowers state audit 
costs, viz. that it be less than cs) but it is analytically convenient. It is also implicit in (1) that the
federal tax agency only recommends audits to the state tax agency when it actually finds a taxpayer 
whom it believes to have attempted to understate his federal taxes. 
For the federal tax agency we have an analogous revenue function: 
The taxpayer minimizes net expected tax payments to the two agencies. Since the taxpayer 
underreports on both returns or neither, we have: 
T(p) =(ts+ tt )/H + P.1{1tttt[pt + Ps(l -pt )qts] +1tsts[ps + Pt(l -ps)qts] 
- ft(l -pt )(1-psqts)- ts(l -ps)(l -ptqsf)} • 
(2) 
(3) 
Equations (1), (2), and (3) are linear in Ps, Pt, and p, respectively. In order to guarantee an 
interior equilibrium (one in which O <Ps ·Pt, p < 1) certain conditions must be met. For example, if
cs and ct are large enough then the Nash Equilibrium is Ps = 0 =Pt and p = 1. Assuming the relevant
conditions hold, we find p3•, pj, and p • by differentiating (1), (2), and (3), setting the results equal to 
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zero, and solving. The relevant derivatives are: 
dR1ldP1 =(l-p3qfs)�(l+1t1) t1CJ- c1; 
aT1a p = �{1t1 t1 [pl+ Ps(l-pl )q1s] + 1ts ts[ps + P1(l -ps)qsf ]- t1(l-pl )(1-psqfs) 
- ts(l-Ps)(l -PJqsf) 
• 
Interior values of p8*,pi , and p* are given by setting (4), (5) and (6) equal to zero and solving the 
resulting three equations. It is not possible to obtain closed-form solutions, but we can still do 
comparative statistics. 
Totally differentiating (4) and (5) and simplifying gives, respectively, 
-qsf tscr(dp1) + (1-pfqsf )cr(d ts) + (1-pfqsf ) tscr'(d p) = 0 ;  and
-qfscr(dps) + (1-Psqfs)cr'(d p) = 0 ,
where cr' = d cr!d p. Differentiating (6) and simplifying gives
((1 + 1tf ) tf (1 -Ps qfs) + (1 + 1ts ) ts (1 -Ps )qsf ](dp/) 
+ [(1 + 1t8 ) t3 (1 -Pf qsf) + (1 + 1tf ) tf (1 -Pf )qf3](dps) 
+ {1ts fps+ PJ(l -Ps)qsf J -(1-Ps)(l -p/qsf )}(d t3) = 0 .
Equations (7), (8) and (9) can be written in the form 
where 
[ 0 X12 X13]
Xz1 0 Xz3 
X31 X32 0
X31=(1+1tf ) ti(l -Psqfs) + (1+1ts) ts(l-Ps)qsf 
X3z = (1+1ts)I., (1-Pfqsf) + (1+1tt ) ti(l -Pt )qfs 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
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Yz = -(1-Pt qsf )cr 
Y3 =-{1ts[ps + Pt(l-Ps)qsf ]-(1-Ps)(l -ptqsf)} · 
Denote the determinant of the X matrix in ( 10) by D . Then 
and 
But 
so that 
x-1 = _!_ D 
[-Xz:iX32 X1¥32 X1zX23 l
XzJX31 -X31X13 X1¥21 
X3zX21 X1zX31 -X1zX21 
X31Yz- X21Y3 =-cr{(l -ptqst )[(1 +1tt ) ft(l-psqts) +1ts fs(l -Ps)qsf] 
+ qsf ls [ps +Pt (1-Ps )qst]} < 0 • 
Therefore d�ldts < O; as state tax rates rise, compliance with the tax laws (both federal and state)
rises. 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
We also get from (11) and (12) that sgn(dp8 /d t8 ) = sgn(dWd t8) < 0. Thus as state tax rates rise,
the state audit rate falls. This is made possible by the increase in compliance. Finally, dptld t8 ,  the
effect of increases in state tax rates on federal auditing, is ambiguous since the decrease in state 
auditing encourages more federal auditing but the increase in federal compliance discourages it. 
The crucial new result in our model is that as long as there is a linkage between the likelihood 
of audit at the state and federal levels, an increase in the state tax rate increases compliance at the 
federal level. This occurs for precisely the same reasons as those which explain the GRW 
hypothesis. Thus, besides being of independent interest, if we can demonstrate that compliance with 
the federal income tax increases with increases in state income taxes, we will have provided indirect 
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support for the GRW hypothesis. Direct support can be provided by an observed positive 
relationship between compliance and the rate of inflation; an uncompensated increase in the price 
level pushes individuals into higher and higher tax brackets without increasing their real income, and 
is thus equivalent to an increase in the federal income tax rate. We next test for a positive 
relationship between compliance and inflation, and for the state tax rate effect. 
3 .  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our empirical analysis focuses on estimation of the relationships between state and federal tax 
rates and compliance with the federal income tax. We specify a model in which compliance depends 
on tax rates, the audit rate, per capita income, and other socio-economic variables. We also examine 
a similar equation which relates total individual collections per return to these factors. We test for a 
state tax rate effect using the actual average state income tax rate, and for a federal tax rate effect 
using the inflation rate. Increases in the inflation rate proxy increases in federal taxes since they 
have pushed taxpayers into higher tax bracket without increasing real income, as discussed in section 
2.10
A. Data 
Our data is drawn from a variety of sources, but the core of our analysis depends on the Annual 
Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the years 1977-85. These reports include 
district level data on Internal Revenue Service collections, number of returns filed, amount and 
number of refunds, number of examinations, total additional tax and penalty recommended after 
examination, and budgets. The data is further broken down by "class of tax"-individual, corporate, 
estate, gift, etc., and IRS district. For most states, the whole state is one district. Until 1984 
California, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas each had two districts and New York had four. In 
1984 another district was added to Texas and three were added to California. In these cases we 
aggregate district level data from the annual reports to the state level. All of this data is reported for 
the government fiscal year, which runs from October 1 to September 30 during 1977-85. 
The focus of our present analysis is on compliance with the individual income tax. This tax 
class includes returns with schedule C or F present (non-farm business or farm) but varies as to 
whether partnership returns are included. Given the importance of tax shelter investments for tax 
compliance in the years relevant here, and the reporting of tax shelter losses on partnership returns as 
well as on Schedules C and E of individual returns, we add partnership returns to individual returns 
whenever the annual reports do not do so. 
Keeping this in mind, we use the following eight primary variables from the annual reports: (1) 
total collections from individual income and employment taxes;11 (2) total refunds to individuals; (3)
total tax returns filed; 12 ( 4) number of individual income tax returns filed; (5) number of excise tax
returns filed; ( 6) number of individual income tax returns examined; (7) additional tax and penalties 
recommended after examination for individual income tax returns; and (8) costs incurred by the 
Internal Revenue Service. 13
Using these eight primary variables, we construct eight secondary variables which are those 
actually used in our analysis. The first three of these are measures of noncompliance. 
BANG: total additional tax and penalty recommended after examination for individual returns, 
9 
per million individual returns examined, in 1972 dollars. 
PBANG: total additional tax and penalty recommended after examination, as a percentage of total 
collections, for individual returns, per million individual returns examined. 
NEANG: total additional tax and penalty recommended after examination, as a percentage of total 
collections, for individual returns, normalized by the audit rate for individual returns. 
BANG is perhaps the most natural of these measures of noncompliance; it is simply the average 
return per audit. There is, however, an abundance of evidence that suggests that the IRS often uses 
percentage compliance as an implicit equity criterion. We therefore define two additional measures 
of noncompliance which are based on the aggregate percentage return from auditing-PBANG 
normalizes total additional tax and penalty as a percentage of total collections by the total number of 
audits and NEANG normalizes it by the audit rate. Other things equal, we interpret an increase in 
any of these measures as reflecting an increase in noncompliance. The remaining variables 
constructed from the data published in the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
are: 
/CR: total collections from individual income and employment taxes divided by the number of 
individual income tax returns, in 1972 dollars-individual collections per return. 
JAR: total individual income tax returns examined as a percentage of the total individual income
tax returns filed-the individual audit rate. 
BPR: the total costs incurred divided by the total returns filed, in 1972 dollars-budget per 
return; 
PIRF: the total number of individual tax returns filed divided by the total number of returns 
filed-percent individual returns filed; and 
PEXF: the total number of excise tax returns filed divided by the total number of returns files-­
percent excise returns filed. 
We also use a number of socio-economic variables taken from a variety of these sources, and a 
time trend. These are all reported by calendar year. 
STAXR: total state income tax paid as a percentage of total state income-the average state 
income tax rate, 
PERED: percent of the adult population with at least a high school education; 
PEROLD: percent of the population over 45; 
UR: the unemployment rate; 
PICAP: per capita income, in 1972 dollars; 
PICAP2: per capita income squared, in 1972 dollars; 
PMAN: percent of the workforce employed in manufacturing; 
PI: percent inflation (measured by changes in the the consumer price index), common for all 
states in given year; and 
TIME: a pure time trend. 
Total state income taxes are taken from State Government Tax Collections, 1977-1985, 
published by the U.S. Department of Commerce. We divide this variable by total state income to 
get the average state tax rate. But constructing a state tax rate variable in this fashion introduces 
potential endogeneity. Therefore we use the maximum statutory marginal tax rate, taken from 
Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1977-1985, published by the U.S. Advisory Commission 
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on Intergovernmental Relations, as an instrument. The latter is clearly exogenous as it represents the 
top rate for each individual and therefore is not behaviorally detennined. Furthermore, it should be 
highly correlated with the average state tax rate. Indeed, reduced fonn equations for the state tax 
rate verify a strong correlation between maximum marginal state income tax rates and measured 
average state income tax rates. Allowing for the endogeneity of state income tax rates in this way 
did not affect our estimations (i.e., the appropriate specification tests failed to detect the presence of 
endogeneity). We thus treat the average state income tax rate as exogenous in the final specifications 
reported below in 3(B). 
The mean values of these variables and their standard deviations are displayed by year in Table 
1. The actual values by state by year of BANG, /CR, JAR, BPR and STAXR are given in the
appendix. 
B. Estimation 
We pool state level data for the years 1977 to 1985 and estimate BANG, P BANG, NEANG and 
/CR a�functions of one-year lagged values of JAR, STAXR, PERED, PEROLD, UR, PICAP,
PICAP2, PMAN, PI and TIME for the years 1978-1985. The estimation is complicated by two 
considerations that need to be addressed simultaneously. First, as we have discussed, it is likely that 
the one-year lagged audit rate, JAR( -1 ), is correlated with the unobservable factors that affect 
compliance and collections per return. To account for this potential endogeneity we instrument 
IAR(-1) with BPR, PIRF and PEXF. Second, the pooled time series cross-section data may contain a 
random state effect that induces dependent observations over time. To account for the presence of 
an unobserved random effect we fonn the optimally weighted average of between and within group 
estimates to obtain the so-called random effects estimator. The weighting factor is calculated by a 
transformation of the estimated standard errors provided by the between and within group 
estimators. Given the potential endogeneity of the audit rate we use instrumental variables to obtain 
consistant estimates of the error components. Transfonnation of the data into Gauss-Markov fonn 
then allows us to test for the presence of endogeneity and to construct consistent and efficient 
estimates of the parameters.14 
GLS estimation of this type provides more than a gain in efficiency. Not adjusting for random 
effects, if present, may lead to incorrect inferences regarding endogeneity and the apparent 
insignificance of some structural effects. In fact, inspection of the residuals obtained using 
instrumental variables indicates a correlative pattern suggestive of an unobserved individual specific 
effect. 
GLS estimates were obtained by subtracting a fraction e of the mean value of each variable by 
state from each observation of that variable within that state. The constant e is a function of the 
error variances consistently estimated in the between and within group estimators, with adjustments 
made for degrees of freedom. For the audit equation, e = 0.269 while for the collections equation 
O = 0.715. In the noncompliance equations, estimates of the error components reveal that the 
variance of the individual specific effect was negligible in comparison with the non-individual 
specific variation, so that it was appropriate to set O = O in these models. 
Table 2 gives results for the noncompliance equations. In each of these, specification tests due 
to Hausman (1978) indicate endogeneity of the audit rate. The test statistics were 7.2, 39.6 and 25.9 
1977 1978 
BANG .66 .66 
(.38) (.23) 
PBANG .59 .58 
(.70) (.70) 
NB ANG .41 .42 
(.18) (.22) 
JAR 1.90 1.80 
(.66) (.59) 
STAXR 1.66 1.65 
(1.16) (1.08) 
!CR 1.98 2.03 
. (.75) (.65) 
PERED . 67 .67 
(.073) (.074) 
PER OLD .44 .43 
(.039) (.038) 
UR .066 .057 
(.016) (.015) 
PI CAP 4.82 5.03 
(.69) (.66) 
PMAN .22 .21 
(.089) (.087) 
PI .075 .070 
(0.0) (0.0) 
BPR .0050 .0050 
(.0013) (.0014) 
PIRF .64 .64 
(.031) (.026) 
PEXF .0090 . 0087 
(.0040) (.0037) 
1 1  
TABLE 1 
Mean Values of Variables by Year 
(Standard errors in parenthesis) 
1979 1980 1981 
.71 .70 .83 
(.22) (.28) (.29) 
.56 .57 .59 
(.61) (.72) (.65) 
.41 .42 .46 
(.16) (.24) (.22) 
1.68 1.68 1.55 
(.58) (.58) (.46) 
1.66 1.61 1.58 
(1.05) (1.04) (1.06) 
2.11 2.14 2.26 
(.66) (.68) (.75) 
.67 .67 .68 
(.075) (.076) (.077) 
.43 .42 .42 
(.038) (.041) (.040) 
.055 .068 .073 
(.014) (.016) (.019) 
5.14 5.14 5.24 
(.65) (.73) (.73) 
.21 .21 .20 
(.085) (.082) (.082) 
.090 .10 .087 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
.0047 .0045 
.0044 
(.0014) (.0014) (.0012) 
.65 .66 .66 
(.027) (.027) (.025) 
.0093 .0079 .0086 
(.0040) (.0031) (.0037) 
• 1985 values of these variables are not used in the current analysis.
1982 1983 1984 1985 
.96 1.17 1.43 1.58 
(.31) (.38) (.55) (.77) 
.62 .74 .90 1.13 
(.65) (.77) (1.04) (2.25) 
.53 .65 .79 .85 
(.22) (.22) (.31) (.55) 
1.42 1.38 1.24 1.16 
(.35) (.38) (.38) (.37) 
1.63 1.70 1.80 1.87 
(1.12) (1.16) (1.17) (1.19) 
2.28 2.21 2.24 2.31 
(.75) (.73) (.77) (.77) 
.68 .67 .68 • 
(.078) (.080) (.081) 
.41 .41 .41 
(.040) (.045) (.038) 
.093 .093 .073 
(.023) (.025) (.022) 
5.20 5.28 5.54 
(.80) (.81) (.81) 
.19 .19 .19 
(.079) (.077) (.077) 
.059 .037 .032 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
.0044 .0048 .0048 
(.0012) (.0013) (.0014) 
.66 .66 .66 
(.026) (.024) (.026) 
.0097 .0088 .0062 • 
(.0034) (.0037) (.0031) 
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TABLE 2 
Instrumental Variables Estimates: BANG, PBANG, NBANG*
Dependent variable 
Independent variable BANG PBANG NBANG 
ONE -14.76 -17.77 -4.9 
(-6.59) (-2.86) (-3.64) 
IAR(-1) .59 1.47 .21 
(5.02) (4.51) (3.01) 
STAXR -7.75 -.17 -5.83 
(-3.61) (-2.88) (-4.49) 
PERED(-1) -.31 4.89 .10 
(-.77) (4.32) (.42) 
PEROW(-1) 1.89 -.75 .80 
(2.48) (-.35) (1.73) 
UR(-1) .10 -8.61 -3.50 
(9.23) (-2.73) (-5.10) 
PICAP(-1) .68 -1.88 -.35 
(2.00) (-1.98) (-1.68) 
PICAP2(-1) -5.32 .12 1.93 
(-1.67) (1.32) (1.00) 
PMAN(-1) .78 .38 -0.42 
(1.75) (.31) (-1.55) 
Pl(-1) -5.88 -7.05 -3.20 
(-4.57) (-1.97) (-4.10) 
TIME .15 .26 7.87 
(7.65) (4.65) (6.48) 
Number of observations 400 400 400 
Standard error of regression .44 1.21 .26 
• t-statistics are in parenthesis.
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for BANG, PBANG, and NBANG, respectively, each of which well exceeds the standard significance 
level for a chi-squared with one degree of freedom (3.8). 
Our results on individual collections per return are presented in Table 3. For comparison, both 
IV and IV-GLS estimates are included, but our subsequent discussion of results is based on the latter. 
(The chi-squared statistic for endogeneity of IAR(-1) in this case was 8.6.) Finally, we present in 
Table 4 the OLS and GLS estimates of the reduced form for the audit rate equation. 
4. RESULTS 
In this section we summarize and discuss briefly the results given in Tables 2, 3 and 4. The first
two of these, concerning the relationships between tax rates and noncompliance, confirm the 
theoretical model developed in section 2 of this paper. In particular, tax rates, measured either by 
STAXR or Pl, are positively related both to compliance and collections per return. A more detailed 
discussion of these and other results follows. 
a) State Tax Rates: An increase in the average state income tax rate significantly decreases
federal noncompliance according to all three measures. Furthermore, it has a significant positive 
effect on collections per return-a 10 percent increase in the average state income tax rate would 
have yielded approximately $26 per return at the federal level, measured in 1985 dollars, 
notwithstanding the deductibility (by taxpayers who itemize deductions) of state income taxes in 
computing federal income tax. 
b) Inflation Rates: Like an increase in the state income tax rate, an increase in the rate of
inflation decreases noncompliance by all three measures, and significantly so in each case. It also 
results in a statistically significant increase in collections per return (notably in the IV-GLS 
estimation but not in the IV estimation). A ten percent increase in the rate of inflation would have 
yielded approximately $27 per return at the federal level, measured in 1985 dollars. 
c) Audit Rates: The audit rate is endogenous in all of the noncompliance equations and the
collections per return equation. As expected, it is influenced significantly by the budget per return, 
with respect to which it is increasing. Also as expected, it is decreasing in the percent employed in 
manufacturing. Surprisingly, perhaps, it is independent of income. Finally, it is increasing in the 
rate of inflation. 
We find in all of our noncompliance equations a positive and very significant coefficient on 
IAR(-1): in equilibrium there is a negative relationship between the audit rate and compliance (recall 
that BANG, PBANG and NBANG are measures of noncompliance). This is because the IRS 
concentrates its audit activities where it believes compliance is the lowest-what we have elsewhere 
called the "yield effect" (Dubin and Wilde, 1986). In this case, even if a deterrent effect of audits is 
present, the yield effect dominates it. 15
But a deterrent effect of audits may still be present If so, it would make sense to include IAR(-
1) in a collections per return equation. Indeed, our estimation confirms that higher audit rates are
associated with higher collections per return: on average, for the period 1977-85, a ten percent 
increase in the audit rate would have generated additional revenue on the order of $87 per return (in 
1985 dollars). This is much more than can be accounted for by the increased additional tax and 
penalty collected as the direct result of the additional audit; i.e., our estimates include a general 
deterrence effect as well as a specific yield effect (see section 4(g) below). 
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TABLE 3 
Estimates of /CR: IV and IV+GLS• 
Independent variable IV IV+GLS 
ONE -10.41 -6.59 
(-4.40) (-4.15) 
IAR(-1) .39 .24 
(3.11) (2.45) 
STAXR 9.78 6.61 
(4.31) (2.65) 
PERED(-1) -.80 .38 
(-1.85) (.75) 
PEROW(-1) 1.86 3.02 
(2.30) (3.14) 
UR(-1) 1.97 1.75 
(1.64) (2.36) 
PICAP(-1) 2.69 .81 
(7.46) (3.20) 
PICAP2(-l) -.18 -1.90 
(-5.42) (-.85) 
PMAN(-1) 2.94 2.73 
(6.25) (5.48) 
P/(-1) 1.02 1.72 
(.75) (2.98) 
TIME 1.96 2.47 
(.92) (1.68) 
Number of observations 400 400 
Standard error of regression .46 .19 
• t-statistics are in parenthesis.
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TABLE 4 
Reduced Form Estimates of IAR(-1): OLS and GLs• 
Independent variable OLS GLS 
ONE 8.45 5.60 
(6. 19) (5.79) 
STAXR -1.80 -1.56 
(-1.06) (-.82) 
PERED(-1) .3 1 .19 
(.85) (.48) 
PEROLD(-1) -1.02 -1.37 
(-1.64) (-2.01) 
UR(-1) .55 .71 
(.60) (.80) 
PJCAP(-1) -.69 -.35 
(-2.63) (-1.33) 
PICAP2(-1) 5.63 2.55 
(2.33) (1.06) 
PMAN(-1) -1.51 -1.43 
(-5.07) (-4.27) 
PJ(-1) 3.10 2.97 
(2.98) (3.31) 
TIME -6.62 -6.84 
(-5.38) (-6.03) 
BPR(-1) 2.17 2.22 
(10.80) ( 10.48) 
PIRF(-1) -.18 .11 
(-.20) (.11) 
PEXF(-1) -4.81 1.26 
(-.80) (.20) 
Number of observations 400 400 
Corrected R-squared .61 .59 
Standard error of regression .34 .29 
* t -statistics are in parenthesis.
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d) Income: As pointed out above, changes in per capita income have no effect on audit rates.
They do, however, have interesting effects on noncompliance. In particular, both percentage 
noncompliance measures (PBANG and NBANG) decrease with increases in per capita income. But 
absolute noncompliance (BANG) increases with increases in per capita income. These results are 
consistent so long as the elasticity of absolute noncompliance with respect to per capita income is 
less than one. In fact, it ranges from below one to above one in our data set, and has a value of .66 at 
the mean. 
Increases in per capita income increase collections per return but at a decreasing rate (this effect 
is so predictable it amounts to a consistency check). Significantly, though, the elasticity of 
collections per return with respe�t to per capita income, evaluated at its mean, is 1.95, much more 
than can be accounted for by increasing marginal tax rates alone. 
e) Other Variables: The effects of our other socio-economic variables are mixed. The
education variable has virtually no effects (except on P BANG). An increase in the age variable 
increases both collections per return and absolute noncompliance, has no effect on percentage 
noncompliance, and decreases the audit rate. An increase in the unemployment rate increa�s 
absolute noncompliance but decreases both measures of percentage noncompliance. It also increases 
collections per return. It appears this variable may be proxying some regional factors, or, perhaps, 
has effects analogous to per capita income since it affects the number of low-income filers. Percent 
employed in manufacturing has no effect on any of the measures of noncompliance, but is positively 
related to collections per return and negatively related to the audit rate. 
f) lntertemporal Effects of Declining Audit Rates: We have conducted some experiments based
on our estimates which examine the intertemporal effects of declining audit rates. Using the IV-GLS 
estimates from Table 3, we have calculated for each year the predicted value of total collections from 
individual returns that would have been realized had the audit rate remained constant at its 1977 
level. These are reported in Figure 1 in comparison to the predicted value of total collections from 
individual returns given the actual audit rate. By 1985 we estimate that maintaining the audit rate at 
its 1977 level would have reduced the compliance gap by 20.79 billion 1972 dollars, or 47.43 billion 
1985 dollars.16 
g) Specific versus General Deterrance: One of the unique aspects of our study is that it allows
us to isolate and estimate the general deterrance aspect of audits. To do this, we first subtract the 
additional taxes and penalties resulting from IRS examinations from total IRS collections, for each 
state and each year. We again subtract refunds from this figure and divide by the number of 
individual returns filed to get a new collections per return variable which does not include the 
revenue generated by the examinations process. We then repeat our IV-GLS estimation using this as 
the dependent variable, and calculate a predicted value for the increase in total individual collections 
for 1985 that would have resulted from holding audit rates at their 1977 levels. This value, $43.46 
billion, is 93% of our original estimate, which included the additional tax and penalty resulting from 
IRS examinations. Thus it represents the general deterrance effect of the increase in audit rates. 
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5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
a) Tax Rates and Compliance: Both our theoretical analysis and our empirical findings suggest
a positive relationship between tax rates and tax compliance; increased tax rates increase 
compliance. Although there is some empirical evidence that reaches an opposite conclusion17 and
our inferences regarding the effects of changes in federal tax rates are based primarily on the effects 
of changes in the inflation rate, at a minimum, our results counsel extreme caution in urging or 
adopting policy recommendations on the assumption that increased compliance will automatically 
accompany tax rate reductions. Notwithstanding the conflict of our findings with the common 
perception that lowering tax rates will stimulate compliance, we have here adduced strong evidence 
suggesting precisely the contrary. 
b) Federal-State Relationships: We have demonstrated an impressive theoretical and empirical
relationship between state and federal tax policies and tax enforcement. Our work not only points to 
the union of state and federal tax administration in improving the efficacy of tax administration at 
both levels of government, but also suggests the potential existence of a wide range of hitherto 
unexamined federal and state tax policy connections. These state-federal interrelationships cry out 
for greater research and policy attention. The federal-state linkages that we have found here confirm 
the importance of considering the impact of federal policy change on the states and vice versa. 
c) Audit Rates and Compliance: Our results corroborate the central role of audit rates in
compliance process. The impact of the decade-long fall in audit rates on tax collections is serious 
indeed. The budgetary practice of routinely including IRS audit personnel within a general political 
philosophy limiting the desired size of government agencies, as has been the practice of the Reagan 
administration, is enormously costly. Additional dollars spent on tax audits would appear to have 
tremendous marginal productivity even now, notwithstanding the fact that the federal revenue 
collection process seems extremely stable over time. 
The Senate's version of the 1986 Tax Reform Act would have created a special Tax 
Administration Trust Fund to ensure increases in IRS enforcement budgets in future years. This 
proposal was explicitly intended to redress Senators' concerns that the audit rate had fallen by half 
during the prior decade. The Senate Finance Committee's Report estimated that this trust fund 
would have produced 17.6 billion dollars of additional revenues in the five fiscal years 1987-1991. 
These estimates were greeted skeptically and the proposal was not included in the 1986 Act as 
finally enacted. Our results here confirm the Senate's general intuitions, if not their precise 
estimates. Further efforts seem warranted to develop legal or institutional mechanisms to protect 
IRS audit capacity. It has not only been ironic, but also foolhardy in the extreme, to cut back on 
such an obviously effective compliance tool as audits at the same time as Congress has been giving 
the IRS a wide range of new procedural, information gathering, and penalty tools to attack what has 
been widely described as apocalyptic noncompliance.18
d) Taxpayer Attitudes and Compliance: Our findings suggest that the widespread claims
asserting a major role in the increases in federal tax noncompliance in recent years of taxpayer 
attitudes toward government in general or the tax system in particular may well be overstated. Both 
our theoretical analysis and our empirical findings convey instead a systematic, and ultimately more 
calculating, rational explanation for why noncompliance is up. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A.I 
BANG 
1977 1978 1979 
0.67 0.79 0.77 
0.38 0.55 0.47 
0.92 0.63 1.03 
0.33 0.72 0.46 
0.41 0.55 0.63 
0.47 0.49 0.88 
0.38 0.76 0.68 
0.61 0.63 0.64 
0.83 0.50 0.61 
0.63 0.78 0.78 
0.53 0.64 0.69 
2.96 0.73 0.63 
0.55 0.46 0.67 
0.53 0.56 0.48 
0.50 0.49 0.54 
0.46 0.56 0.58 
0.54 1.08 0.56 
0.81 0.92 l.17 
0.61 0.94 0.71 
0.78 0.65 0.66 
0.59 0.52 0.72 
0.58 0.91 0.73 
0.63 0.75 0.80 
0.96 0.96 0.90 
0.55 0.37 0.62 
0.69 0.65 0.62 
0.72 0.49 0.61 
0.51 0.56 0.56 
0.42 0.50 0.60 
0.69 0.50 0.71 
0.50 0.61 0.72 
0.70 0.48 0.54 
0.32 0.49 0.58 
0.76 0.75 0.81 
0.57 0.71 0.84 
0.72 0.49 0.64 
0.78 0.98 0.68 
0.51 0.49 0.68 
0.65 0.87 0.92 
0.69 0.53 0.65 
0.63 0.49 0.74 
0.47 0.53 0.75 
0.47 0. 70 0.54 
1980 1981 
0.60 1.04 
0.51 0.54 
0.61 0.71 
0.49 0.49 
0.47 0.83 
0.74 1.07 
0.92 1.81 
0.59 0.77 
0.43 0.79 
0.80 0.93 
0.68 0.72 
l.29 0.76 
0.60 0.81 
0.52 0.47 
0.40 0.53 
0.63 0.60 
0.55 l.22 
l.09 l.50 
0.56 0.61 
0.60 0.63 
0.58 0.62 
0.77 0.69 
l.51 0.73 
l.59 l.30 
0.44 0.48 
0.73 0.96 
0.61 0.79 
0.44 0.52 
0.59 0.73 
0.56 l.05 
0.76 0.97 
0.55 0.78 
0.45 0.52 
0.82 l.12 
l.44 0.94 
0.55 0.61 
0.45 0.67 
0.80 0.74 
0.65 0.96 
0.78 0.72 
0.71 l.55 
0.54 0.69 
0.95 0.64 
1982 1983 
0.94 l.61 
0.55 0.64 
0.95 1.43 
0.59 0.53 
0.84 l.74 
0.66 l.06 
l.16 l.28 
0.97 l.45 
1.03 l.15 
l.30 1.47 
l.19 l.19 
0.67 0.86 
0.93 0.99 
0.72 0.88 
l.13 l.12 
0.65 0.15 
0.68 0.62 
2.16 2.15 
0.89 0.68 
0.82 0.73 
0.78 1.17 
1.65 1.29 
0.94 l.28 
l.19 0.97 
0.53 0.87 
1.03 l.40 
0.76 l.00 
0.68 0.76 
0.79 0.74 
0.82 0.91 
0.99 l.59 
0.74 1.01 
0.57 0.84 
l.18 2.46 
1.02 1.20 
0.86 1.03 
0.56 0.79 
1984 
1.88 
1.08 
1.31 
0.68 
l.48 
1.09 
1.41 
1.46 
l.64 
1.23 
1.26 
0.76 
l.84 
0.86 
0.80 
0.83 
0.93 
3.37 
1.54 
l.16 
1.38 
1.84 
0.87 
0.96 
0.88 
2.42 
1.26 
0.84 
1.17 
1.41 
2.13 
0.97 
0.80 
2.02 
l.70 
2.37 
l.50 
0.87 
l.06 
0.99 
1.74 
0.94 
1.02 
1.11 1.31 
1.18 l.44 
1.20 l.20 
1.90 2.90 
l.20 1.22 
l.08 . 1.21 
0.60 0.49 
0.44 0.45 
0.49 0.55 
0.62 0.72 
l.16 l.73 
l.13 0.54 
0.71 0.80 
0.50 0.57 0.66 0.92 
0.52 0.53 0.81, 0.70 
0.74 0.56 0.67 l.20 
0.71 0.58 0.90 l.26 
l.84 1.13 1.18 l.39 
0.66 0.67 l.06 l.07 
0.86 0.57 0.78 0.95 
0.96 
l.50 
l.35 
l.25 
l.58 
l.23 
l.13 
l.27 
l.84 
2.01 
l.36 
l.98 
l.27 
1.()() 
1985 
l.91 
0.99 
l.14 
0.73 
1.34 
l.72 
l.83 
1.26 
l.70 
l.34 
l.79 
0.77 
l.68 
l.24 
0.82 
0.87 
l.09 
2.69 
l.57 
l.30 
l.90 
l.45 
0.87 
l.05 
0.69 
2.63 
l.21 
0.70 
l.88 
1.55 
2.10 
l.08 
0.93 
3.03 
5.14 
1.36 
l.03 
l.60 
l.52 
l.10 
3.03 
l.69 
l.58 
l.22 
l.98 
1.41 
l.56 
2.81 
l.65 
l.36 
State 
New York 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
Vermont 
Connecticut 
New Hampshire 
Rhode Island 
Maryland 
New Jersey 
Pennsylvania 
Virginia 
Delaware 
Georgia 
Alabama 
South Carolina 
North Carolina 
Mississippi 
Florida 
Tennessee 
Ohio 
Michigan 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
West Virginia 
South Dakota 
Illinois 
Iowa 
North Dakota 
Wisconsin 
Nebraska 
Missouri 
Minnesota 
New Mexico 
Texas 
Wyoming 
Colorado 
Arkansas 
Louisiana 
Oklahoma 
Kansas 
Alaska 
Idaho 
Montana 
Hawaii 
California 
Arizona 
Oregon 
Nevada 
Utah 
Washington 
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TABLE A.2 
!CR 
1977 1978 1979 
3.07 3.26 3.28 
1 .29 l .29 l.32
2.09 2. 18 2.26 
1.24 1 . 17 1.34 
3.63 2. 75 2.93 
1 .47 1.57 1.65 
1 .83 2.29 2.26 
2.71 2.94 3.07 
3.95 2.72 2.59 
2.16 2.li6 2.65 
1 .53 l .62 1 .70 
3.48 3.87 3.86 
1 .53 1 .70 1 .75 
1 .43 1.54 1.59 
1.24 l .35 1.42 
1.53 l.57 1.64 
1 .05 1.08 1 .13 
1 .86 1.(,6 1.78 
3.29 1.51 1.58 
2.53 2.70 2.94 
2.21 3 . 12 3.43 
1 .69 2.30 2.31 
1 .43 1.54 1.58 
1 .34 1.36 1 .40 
1.25 1.24 1.3 1  
3.96 3 .18  3.15 
1 .62 1.63 1.71 
1 .48 1 .44 1.55 
1 .85 2.06 2. 13
1 .88 2.09 2.33 
2.41 2.79 2.91 
2.64 2.81 3.00 
1 . 1 8  l.33 1.37 
2.32 2.28 2.54 
1 .47 1.60 1.70 
1.74 2.92 3.00 
1.22 1.27 1.31 
1 .62 1.86 1.92 
1 .72 1.94 2.06 
1.58 1.93 2.06 
3 . 1 4  2.68 2.54 
1 .73 1.95 1.97 
1 .27 1.29 1.35 
1 .80 1 .79 1.82 
2.3 1 2.34 2.40 
1 .46 1.(,6 1 .75 
2.52 1.84 1.99 
1 .  90 2. 1 1 2.23 
1 .46 1.59 1.65 
1 .92 2. 14 2.32 
1980 1981 
3.49 3.70 
1 .34 1.46 
2.39 2.60 
1.34 1.43 
3.22 4.68 
1 .68 1 .84 
2.25 2.41 
3.04 3.30 
2.61 2.47 
2.71 2.80 
1 .72 1.80 
3.97 3 .16 
1 .82 1.93 
1 .57 1 .65 
1 .43 1.48 
1 .66 1.69 
1.12 1 . 17 
1 .84 1.99 
1 .60 1.53 
2.73 2.92 
3.17 3.27 
2.28 2.43 
1 .58 1.59 
1 .41 1 .42 
1 .29 1.33 
3.26 3.54 
1 .7 1  1.74 
1.52 1.75 
2. 15 2.22 
2.34 2.43 
2.98 3.09 
3.09 3.21 
1 .39 1.44 
2.49 2.73 
1 .79 1 .85 
3.04 3.28 
1 .30 1.35 
2.04 2.21 
2.44 2.85 
2. 17 2.27 
2.55 2.85 
2.00 2. 13
1 .36 1.41 
1 .89 1.91 
2.54 2.60 
1 .75 1.76 
1 .76 2.17 
2.25 2.20 
1.66 1.74 
2.33 2.40 
1982 
3.77 
l.43
2.67 
1.48 
4.36 
1.92 
2.35 
3.29 
2.59 
2.73 
1.83 
4.05 
1.88 
1.64 
1.48 
1.67 
1.39 
1.93 
1.71 
2.86 
3 .16 
2.43 
l.61
1.49 
1.35 
3.34 
1.69 
1 .72 
2. 1 8
2.44 
3.06 
3.27 
1.50 
2.77 
1.86 
3.45 
1.38 
2.23 
2.85 
2. 1 8
2.97 
2.08 
1.52 
1.82 
2.61 
1 .72 
1.98 
2.12 
1.71 
2.34 
1983 
3.75 
1 .42 
2.69 
1.74 
3.89 
1.93 
2.19 
3.36 
2.62 
2.57 
1 .85 
4.07 
1 .95 
1 .64 
1 .45 
1 .68 
1 . 19  
1 .94 
1 .80 
2.77 
3 . 1 1 
2.43 
1.55 
1 .36 
1.34 
3.19 
1 .61 
1 .60 
2.05 
2.40 
3.13  
3.27 
1 .45 
2.63 
1 .60 
3.35 
1 .40 
2.04 
2.47 
2.12 
2.93 
1 .95 
1 .40 
1 .75 
2.57 
1 .66 
1 .85 
2.04 
1 .72 
2.23 
1984 
3.87 
1.42 
2.80 
1.50 
3.92 
1.97 
2.26 
3.58 
2.87 
2.62 
1.93 
4.24 
2.06 
1.62 
1.47 
1.74 
1 . 18 
2.00 
1.85 
2.84 
3.41 
2.48 
1.56 
1.32 
1.37 
3.25 
1.59 
1.54 
2.07 
2.39 
3.09 
3.28 
1.44 
2.64 
1.56 
3.20 
1.46 
2.00 
2.39 
2.20 
2.75 
1.94 
1.33 
1 .73 
2.63 
1 .73 
1 .88 
2.07 
1.76 
2.21 
1985 
3.83 
1 .47 
2.96 
1 .60 
4.03 
2.06 
2.40 
3.57 
3.19 
2.69 
2.05 
4.32 
2.19 
1 .70 
1 .50 
1 .78 
1 . 19  
2.07 
2.07 
2.89 
3.58 
2.53 
1 .64 
1 .38 
1.35 
3.32 
1 .62 
1 .58 
2. 13
2.37 
3.20 
3.43 
1.54 
2.75 
1 .57 
2.87 
1 .52 
1 .99 
2.48 
2.25 
2.79 
1.97 
1 .35 
1 .76 
2.76 
1 .86 
1 .95 
2.23 
2.06 
2.16 
State 
New York 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
Vermont 
Connecticut 
New Hampshire 
Rhode Island 
Maryland 
New Jersey 
Pennsylvania 
Virginia 
Delaware 
Georgia 
Alabama 
South Carolina 
North Carolina 
Mississippi 
Rorida 
Tennessee 
Ohio 
Michigan 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
West Virginia 
South Dakota 
Illinois 
Iowa 
North Dakota 
Wisconsin 
Nebraska 
Missouri 
Minnesota 
New Mexico 
Texas 
Wyoming 
Colorado 
Arkansas 
Louisiana 
Oklahoma 
Kansas 
Alaska 
Idaho 
Montana 
Hawaii 
California 
Arizona 
Oregon 
Nevada 
Utah 
Washington 
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TABLE A.3 
!AR 
1977 1978 1979 1980 198 1 
3 . 1 0  2.39 2.24 2.23 2.00 
1 .64 1.30 0.99 1 .00 0.92 
1 .48 1.40 1 .27 1 .40 1.42 
2.35 1 .84 1 .63 1 .62 1.27 
1 .70 1 .22 1.50 1 .63 1.40 
2.28 1.65 1.16 0.99 0.82 
1 .46 1.00 1 .05 0.92 0.89 
2. 16 1.86 1.83 1 .84 1.73 
1 .85 2.04 1.89 1 .85 1.51 
1 .40 1.54 1.46 1 . 1 8  1 .20 
1.53 1.56 1.57 1.54 1.50 
1 .34 1.54 1.46 1 .59 1.77 
2.43 2.41 2.02 1 .99 1 .62 
1 .67 2. 10 2.26 1 .90 1.69 
1 .65 1.51 1.56 1 .48 1.28 
1 .88 1 .67 1.59 1 .41  1.28 
2.30 2.34 2.20 2.19 1.87 
2.15 2.12 1.97 1 .93 1.61 
1 .56 1.50 1.39 1 .45 1.61 
1 .29 1 . 1 8  1 . 1 2  1 . 1 1  1 . 15 
1 .55 1 .70 1.54 1 .37 1.36 
l .27 l . 12 1 . 1 4  0.92 0.84 
l .60 1.35 1.20 l . 1 0  1 .25 
l .06 1.09 0.97 0.8 1  0.97 
2.09 2.01 1.34 1 .62 1.77 
2.01 1 .77 1.66 1 .58 1.59 
1 .46 1 .56 1.46 1 .53 1.51 
1 .59 1.53 1.30 1 .84 l.96 
1 .47 1.31 1 .01  1 .07 0. 99 
1 .62 1. 72 1 .46 1 .57 l.37 
1 .78 1 .74 l.51 1 .34 1.37 
1 .68 1 . 89 1 .7 1  1 .61 1.42 
l .62 1 .39 1.42 1 .65 1.50 
1 .7 1  1.74 1.59 1 .47 l . 17 
l.57 1 .66 1.56 1 .99 1.69 
1 .81  1 .82 1 .33 1 .69 l.69 
1 .66 1 .63 1.55 1.51 1.33 
1 .63 1 .  70 1 .63 2.04 1 .  78 
1 .95 1.86 1.57 1 .54 1.23 
1 .89 2.00 1.53 1 .56 1.36 
3.87 3.61 3.81 4.05 3.14 
1 .69 1.70 2.02 1 .89 1.95 
1 .92 1.54 1 .81  1 .54 l.68 
1 .85 2.09 2.04 2.26 l .87 
3.41 3.22 3.26 3.06 2.33 
2.52 2.32 2.25 2.23 2.17 
1 .23 l . 15 l . 1 8  1 .20 l.28 
4.68 4. 16 3.51 3.20 2.92 
1.96 l .96 2.06 2.00 l.91 
1 .47 1.54 1.49 1 .59 l .50 
1982 1983 
1 .63 1 .59 
l . 15  1 . 10 
l . 13  0.90 
1.00 1 . 1 2  
1.28 1 .09 
0.88 0.96 
1.08 1 .35 
1.27 1 . 15 
1.56 1 .53 
0.99 0.88 
1.23 1 . 1 4  
1.52 1 .3 1  
1.50 1 .38 
1.58 1 .42 
1.08 1 . 1 3  
l.24 1 . 19 
1.49 1 .45 
1.43 1 .40 
1.42 1 .38 
1 . 1 1  l . 1 5  
l .19 1 . 1 1 
0.84 0.98 
l . 14  1 . 13  
0.94 1.04 
1.86 1 .57 
1.40 1 .26 
1.35 1 . 1 4  
l.70 2.05 
0.91 1 .05 
l.62 1 . 1 6  
l.23 1 . 1 0  
l .63 1 .43 
1.57 1 .39 
l . 1 8  1 .23 
1.76 2.24 
l.46 1 .45 
l.34 l .3 1  
l.49 1 .28 
1 . 15  1 . 16 
1.26 1 . 1 6  
2.59 2.46 
1.58 1 .70 
l .79 1 .55 
l.54 l .49 
2.05 1 .97 
1 .67 l .61  
1.34 1 .41  
2.44 2.73 
1.70 l.64 
1.57 1 .43 
1984 1985 
1 .31 1 .29 
0.83 0.8 1  
0.71 0.71 
l . 14 1 .04 
1.23 1 . 1 3  
0.79 0.55 
1 . 16 0.74 
1 .01 1 . 13 
l .34 l .07 
0. 81 0.79 
0.92 0.94 
l.33 1 . 17 
1 .23 1 .06 
l . 1 1  0.98 
0.98 0.95 
1.02 0.92 
1.28 1 .35 
1.38 1 . 1 4  
1 . 16 1 .07 
0.93 0.90 
0.91 0.91 
0.70 0.63 
0.85 0.72 
0.95 0.85 
1.41 1 .07 
1.00 0.91 
0.89 0.86 
l .67 1 .42 
0.83 0.73 
l . 1 8  1 .03 
0.97 0.95 
l . 17 1 .05 
1.44 1.29 
l . 1 8  l.33 
1 .94 1 .67 
1.38 1.40 
1.30 1 .09 
1.31  1.45 
1.21 1.41 
l . 16 1 .20 
2.43 2.35 
1.59 1 .56 
1.37 1 . 1 5  
1.39 1 .59 
1.61 1 .70 
1.45 1 .70 
l .36 1.36 
2.49 2.22 
1 .97 1 .47 
1.41 1 .40 
State 
New York 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
Vermont 
Connecticut 
New Hampshire 
Rhode Island 
Maryland 
New Jersey 
Pennsylvania 
Virginia 
Delaware 
Georgia 
Alabama 
South Carolina 
North Carolina 
Mississippi 
Florida 
Tennessee 
Ohio 
Michigan 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
West Virginia 
South Dakota 
Illinois 
Iowa 
North Dakota 
Wisconsin 
Nebraska 
Missouri 
Minnesota 
New Mexico 
Texas 
Wyoming 
Colorado 
Arkansas 
Louisiana 
Oklahoma 
Kansas 
Alaska 
Idaho 
Montana 
Hawaii 
California 
Arizona 
Oregon 
Nevada 
Utah 
Washington 
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TABLE A.4 
BPR 
1977 1978 1979 
0.76 0.71 0.68 
0.49 0.45 0.41 
0.56 0.56 0.54 
0.56 0.53 0.47 
0.47 0.45 0.45 
0.51 0.47 0.41 
0.65 0.64 0.57 
0.54 0.53 0.50 
0.56 0.58 0.51 
0.48 0.48 0.44 
0.40 0.38 0.36 
0.57 0.65 0.59 
0.53 0.55 0.53 
0.37 0.38 0.37 
0.34 0.34 0.3 1 
0.37 0.37 0.36 
0.42 0.41 0.39 
0.47 0.47 0.44 
0.36 0.36 0.35 
0.46 0.45 0.44 
0.47 0.46 0.44 
0.38 0.38 0.37 
0.40 0.41 0.40 
0.45 0.43 0.44 
0.48 0.46 0.42 
0.55 0.52 0.52 
0.36 0.37 0.37 
0.43 0.45 0.39 
0.35 0.34 0.33 
0.44 0.47 0.44 
0.56 0.54 0.52 
0.46 0.49 0.48 
0.48 0.47 0.43 
0.53 0.52 0.50 
0.59 0.58 0.50 
0.49 0.51 0.48 
0.45 0.44 0.43 
0.45 0.46 0.45 
0.54 0.53 0.50 
0.42 0.44 0.44 
1 .00 1 . 12 1.19 
0.52 0.53 0.52 
0.46 0.46 0.45 
0.56 0.56 0.58 
0.51 0.50 0.47 
0.47 0.48 0.45 
0.39 0.37 0.37 
1 .02 0.98 0.89 
0.44 0.45 0.43 
0.44 0.45 0.43 
1980 198 1 
0.65 0.63 
0.38 0.37 
0.53 0.51 
0.45 0.42 
0.41 0.43 
0.39 0.37 
0.55 0.52 
0.48 0.50 
0.48 0.47 
0.41 0.40 
0.34 0.32 
0.58 0.56 
0.52 0.53 
0.36 0.35 
0.29 0.27 
0.33 0.32 
0.36 0.35 
0.40 0.37 
0.33 0.36 
0.41 0.42 
0.42 0.41 
0.35 0.34 
0.37 0.37 
0.42 0.40 
0.43 0.43 
0.51 0.52 
0.36 0.34 
0.42 0.41 
0.32 0.31 
0.43 0.41 
0.50 0.48 
0.46 0.44 
0.40 0.38 
0.49 0.50 
0.46 0.47 
0.45 0.44 
0.40 0.40 
0.42 0.39 
0.46 0.44 
0.42 0.39 
1.21 1.05 
0.49 0.49 
0.41 0.39 
0.55 0.52 
0.47 0.46 
0.42 0.39 
0.34 0.39 
0.83 0.74 
0.41 0.41 
0.41 0.40 
1982 1983 
0.62 0.65 
0.38 0.38 
0.49 0.51 
0.40 0.42 
0.44 0.47 
0.38 0.40 
0.51 0.51 
0.49 0.54 
0.47 0.49 
0.39 0.42 
0.33 0.35 
0.54 0.57 
0.52 0.59 
0.35 0.37 
0.24 0.28 
0.3 1 0.32 
0.34 0.35 
0.35 0.40 
0.36 0.41 
0.42 0.48 
0.41 0.46 
0.35 0.40 
0.36 0.40 
0.40 0.44 
0.42 0.43 
0.52 0.57 
0.33 0.34 
0.40 0.42 
0.31 0.33 
0.38 0.41 
0.48 0.49 
0.43 0.42 
0.38 0.40 
0.50 0.58 
0.49 0.64 
0.44 0.51 
0.40 0.43 
0.40 0.44 
0.43 0.49 
0.40 0.43 
0.99 1 .07 
0.47 0.53 
0.38 0.43 
0.52 0.57 
0.47 0.55 
0.38 0.44 
0.40 0.46 
0.76 0.85 
0.42 0.50 
0.41 0.48 
1984 
0.65 
0.37 
0.48 
0.42 
0.48 
0.38 
0.46 
0.55 
0.48 
0.42 
0.34 
0.60 
0.61 
0.37 
0.29 
0.34 
0.39 
0.42 
0.47 
0.49 
0.45 
0.42 
0.38 
0.45 
0.41 
0.57 
0.33 
0.41 
0.32 
0.40 
0.49 
0.42 
0.39 
0.63 
0.63 
0.58 
0.43 
0.45 
0.52 
0.42 
1.06 
0.51 
0.43 
0.58 
0.61 
0.43 
0.45 
0.89 
0.54 
0.50 
1985 
0.62 
0.34 
0.48 
0.40 
0.46 
0.36 
0.44 
0.54 
0.46 
0.41 
0.33 
0.54 
0.63 
0.34 
0.27 
0.3 1 
0.36 
0.41 
0.44 
0.48 
0.42 
0.39 
0.36 
0.42 
0.39 
0.56 
0.33 
0.41 
0.32 
0.39 
0.49 
0.42 
0.36 
0.62 
0.60 
0.62 
0.39 
0.42 
0.50 
0.41 
1.05 
0.48 
0.40 
0.54 
0.58 
0.42 
0.43 
0.84 
0.49 
0.48 
State 
New York 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
Vennont 
Connecticut 
New Hampshire 
Rhode Island 
Maryland 
New Jersey 
Pennsylvania 
Virginia 
Delaware 
Georgia 
Alabama 
South Carolina 
North Carolina 
Mississippi 
Florida 
Tennessee 
Ohio 
Michigan 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
West Virginia 
South Dakota 
Illinois 
Iowa 
North Dakota 
Wisconsin 
Nebraska 
Missouri 
Minnesota 
New Mexico 
Texas 
Wyoming 
Colorado 
Arkansas 
Louisiana 
Oklahoma 
Kansas 
Alaska 
Idaho 
Montana 
Hawaii 
California 
Arizona 
Oregon 
Nevada 
Utah 
Washington 
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TABLE A.5 
STAXR 
1977 1978 1979 
3.39 3.10 3. 17 
1 .23 1 .50 1.47 
2.87 3. 10 3.22 
2.52 2. 12 2.33 
0.24 0.28 0.27 
0. 13 0. 15 0. 13
1 .66 1 .60 2.01 
2.71 2.70 2.24 
1 .22 1.21 1 .23 
1 .44 1 .47 1.55 
2.04 2.25 2.17 
3.77 3.86 3.91 
1 .65 1 .90 1 .9 1  
1 .28 1.37 1.39 
1 . 8 1  1 .95 2.03 
2.41 2.32 2.42 
1 . 1 1  1 . 16 1 .29 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.09 0.09 0.08 
0.82 0.93 0.93 
2.07 2.20 2.29 
1 .3 1  1 .31  1 .27 
1 .66 1.70 1 .77 
1 .50 1.53 1.56 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 .63 1.63 1.59 
3.13 2. 16 2.25 
1 .36 1.45 0.98 
3.60 3.76 3.48 
1 .63 1 .51  1 .60 
1 .23 1.24 1.36 
3.42 3.45 3.55 
0.38 0.59 0.77 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 .83 1 .  T1 1.85 
1 .40 1 .51  1.55 
0.58 0.74 0.81 
1 .23 1 .27 1.41 
1 .27 1 .29 1.40 
4.87 3.37 2.55 
2.24 2.3 1  2. 15
2.43 2.24 2.42 
3.04 3. 1 1 3. 1 3  
2. 1 1 2.37 2.12 
1 .29 1 . 30 1 .33 
3.42 3.62 3.62 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
2.14 2. 1 8 2.32 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
1980 1981 
3 .20 3.27 
1 .59 1.78 
3 . 1 5  3. 18
2. 1 1 2.20 
0.28 0.29 
0. 12 0. 13
1 .72 1.95 
2.64 2.08 
1 .24 1.27 
1 .49 1.52 
2. 19 2.26 
3.87 3.85 
1 .98 2.06 
1 .37 1.60 
2. 1 8 2.22 
2.56 2.51 
0.90 1.03 
0.00 0.00 
0.09 0.09 
1 .02 1.01 
2.07 1.99 
1 . 1 3  1.21 
1 .80 1 .84 
1 .66 1 .64 
0.00 0.00 
1 .58 1.54 
2.21 2.28 
0.93 0.89 
3.22 3.46 
1 .65 1.23 
1 .38 1.37 
3.16 3.16 
0.46 0.62 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
1 .59 1 .32 
1.92 1.69 
0.69 0.45 
1 . 3 1  1 .56 
1 .43 1.59 
1 .94 0. 12
2.07 2.17 
1.98 1 .88 
3 . 16  3.07 
2.49 2.25 
1 .20 1.34 
3.54 3.77 
0.00 0.00 
2.35 2.33 
0.00 0.00 
1982 
3.69 
2.03 
3.33 
2.28 
0.32 
0. 1 5  
2.09 
2.76 
1.34 
1.53 
2.37 
4.08 
2. 1 9  
1 . 4 1  
2.36 
2.67 
0.85 
0.00 
0.1 1  
1 .08 
2. 1 3  
1.37 
1 .83 
1.79 
0.00 
1.61 
2.30 
0.49 
3.28 
1.34 
1 .51  
3.36 
0. 1 2  
0.00 
0.00 
1.46 
1 .83 
0.49 
1.78 
1.62 
0.02 
2.54 
1 .89 
2.45 
2.40 
I.SI 
3.53 
0.00 
2.40 
0.00 
1983 
3.60 
2.08 
3.23 
2.22 
0.38 
0.15 
2.35 
2.74 
1 .3 8  
1 .50 
2.30 
4.08 
2.25 
1.52 
2.40 
2.60 
0.95 
0.00 
0.12 
1 .64 
2.47 
1 .42 
1 .86 
1 .73 
0.00 
1 .54 
2.34 
0.44 
3.23 
1 . 56 
1 .61 
4.01 
0. 1 2
0.00 
0.00 
1 .63 
1 . 87 
0.50 
1 .79 
1 . 8 1  
0.02 
2.38 
1 .87 
2.80 
2.29 
1 .52 
4 . 13  
0.00 
2.38 
0.00 
1984 
3.74 
2. 12
3.31 
2.31 
0.54 
0. 17
2.3 1  
2.77 
1 .54 
1 .73 
2.39 
4. 10
2. 19
1 .56 
2.39 
2.69 
1 . 13 
0.00 
0. 1 1
1 .88 
2.98 
1 . 87 
1 . 84 
2.06 
0.00 
1 .87 
2.23 
0.86 
3.72 
1.55 
1 .49 
4.20 
0.51 
0.00 
0.00 
1.75 
1. 89 
0.84 
1 .70 
1.75 
O.ot 
2.25 
2.03 
3.05 
2.51 
1.49 
3.92 
0.00 
2.40 
0.00 
1985 
4.01 
2.33 
3 .62 
2.45 
0.55 
0. 19
2.21 
2.95 
1 .63 
1 .70 
2.56 
4.22 
2.49 
1.72 
2.47 
2.95 
1.09 
0.00 
0. 12
2.03 
2.59 
1 .92 
1 .95 
2.54 
0.00 
1 .59 
2.26 
0.86 
3.31 
1.57 
1 .67 
3.92 
0.56 
0.00 
0.00 
2.01 
1 .99 
1 .05 
1 .81  
1 .80 
0.01 
2.46 
2.09 
3.14 
2.83 
1 .66 
4.07 
0.00 
2.59 
0.00 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Aaron and Galper (1985, page 42). Consider also, for example, Thomas Vitez, quoted in the
Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1984: "The principal reason [for the growing compliance gap] is
that inflation is pushing people into higher and higher tax brackets and increasing the pressure
to cheat," or Alfred Blumenstein (1983): "Reducing the benefits [of tax evasion] means finding 
ways to reduce the marginal rate." See generally Graetz and Wilde (1986).
2. Testimony by Roscoe L. Egger in U. S. Congress (1985, page 197). See also pages 186 and 209
where the Commissioner speculates that the increase in revenue from taxpayers in higher
income tax brackets following the 1981 reduction in the top rate from 70 to 50 percent was due
to greater compliance by persons in those brackets.
3. A recent cross-section study due to Cox (1986), raises the issue of the effect of state income
taxes on federal income tax compliance. Using 1979 TCMP data, but controlling only for
income, he finds no systematic evidence of an effect of state tax rates on compliance. Crane
and Nourzad (1986) attempt to analyze the effect of inflation on aggregate tax evasion over the
period 1947-81, concluding that increases in the inflation rate or the marginal tax rate increased
tax evasion. Their measure of tax evasion is based on the difference between the Adjusted
Gross Income estimate derived by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and that reported by the
IRS, their measure of the fine rate is the ratio of additional taxes and penalties assessed by the
IRS to the amount of tax evaded, and their measure of true income is the same BEA estimate of
adjusted gross income used to construct their measure of tax evasion. Their estimation allows
for the simultaniety introduced by the construction of the latter, but not audit rates, fines, or
marginal tax rates, the last of which is constructed using a technique similar to that of Clotfelter
(1983). It is therefore unlikely that their results are reliable. See also note 17, below.
4. For example, Vitez (1983, pp. 191) has remarked that: "the dramatic deterioration in
compliance levels witnessed thus far, if not reversed quickly and forcefully, will gain further
momentum and eventually erode, beyond repair, the integrity of our present income tax
system."
5. This is a point which the empirical literature on crime, in contexts other than tax law, has taken
into account (see, e.g., Pyle, 1983), but in the empirical literature on tax compliance has either
been ignored (e.g., Witte and Woodbury, 1985) or improperly dealt with (e.g., Clotfelter, 1983).
6. Persons who willfully violate the tax laws, may be subject to criminal prosecution. The most
frequently used criminal provisions in the Code are § 7201, which provides that willfully
attempting to evade or defeat any tax is a felony punishable by a fine of up to $100,000 
($500,000 for a corporation) or imprisonment for a maximum of five years, or both; § 7203,
which provides that willful failure to file a return, supply required infmmation, keep required
records, or pay tax due is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum fine of $25 ,000 ($100,00
25 
for a corporation) and by imprisonment for a maximum of one year; and § 7206, which makes it 
a felony punishable by a maximum fine of $100,000 ($500,000 for a corporation) and by 
imprisonment for a maximum of three years to file a return that the taxpayer does not believe to 
be true and correct as to every material matter . Section 720 1  requires the government to prove 
a substantial tax deficiency, but §§ 7203 and 7206 do not. 
7. Internal Revenue Service, Manual, Disclosure of Information Handbook, § (33) 00. 
8. Internal Revenue Service, Manual, Disclosure of Information Handbook § (33) 42.2.
9. Id. at Exhibit (33) 00-1,  Section 5. 1 (Draft Agreement on Coordination of Tax Administration).
10. We have constructed an average marginal tax rate variable for the aggregate U.S. using the
procedures described by Barro and Sahasak.ul ( 1983). The Internal Revenue Service publishes
in Statistics of Income and Statistics of Income Bulletin tables which classify the number of
returns by highest marginal tax rate on each return for the aggregate U.S. (state-level
break.downs ofthis data are not available). We weight each marginal rate by the percentage of
returns in that class. The outcome ranges from 18.69 to 2 1.81 percent in the years 1977-85, and
takes on common values for all states in a given year. It was insignificant in all our models and
therefore dropped in the final specifications reported below in section 3(B).
1 1. This variable includes any additional tax and penalty collected as the result of examinations. 
12. Prior to 1981 virtually all nonprofit organizations filed in Delaware. Starting in 198 1 they
began to file in the district of primary activity. We have therefore subtracted nonprofit returns
filed from total returns filed (the former amounts to less than 2 percent of the latter). Also, prior
to 1981 "declarations of estimated tax" were recorded as one entry per year for any taxpayer
filing a declaration of estimated tax in any quarter. Starting in 198 1 each quarterly form was
counted as one entry, increasing the number of declarations of estimated tax by approximately a
factor of four. We have adjusted "total returns filed" for 198 1-85 to account for this.
13. We have ignored the approximately one to two percent of "examinations" that take place at
seven "regional service centers," each of which covers six to eight states. Thus "number of
returns examined," "additional tax and penalty," and "costs"  include only the district level
figures from the annual reports. Also, Tables 9 and 10, covering "number of returns examined"
and "additional tax and penalty," were discovered to have their headings reversed in the 1981
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
14. Within-group estimation or equivalently fixed-effects does not account for variation across
states and is therefore not fully efficient. This last point notwithstanding, we have performed
specification tests on the fixed-effects models and have detected the continued presence of
endogeneous audit rates. This suggests that at least some portion of the endogeneity of the
26 
audit effect is due to its correlation with the unobserved non-individual specific error. This 
precludes the use of other estimation methods which might seem to be appropriate in this 
context, including, for example, that suggested by Hausman and Taylor (1981). 
15. The theoretical model of section 2 yields an ambiguous prediction regarding the effect of
inflation (i.e., higher tax rates) on auditing. That we see a positive coefficient on PI in the 
JAR( -1) regression, however, is consistent with the fact that with respect to audits, the yield
effect dominates the deterrent effect in our noncompliance regressions: in other words, the IRS
seems to be optimizing better than taxpayers.
16. To put this 47.43 billion dollar figure into perspective, it should be kept in mind that the
average audit rate fell from 1.9 percent to 1.24 percent over this period, and the gain in revenue
from holding it constant at its 1977 level amounts to 8.6 percent of total individual collections
in 1985 (net of refunds). The standard error of this estimate is 19.39.
17. Using individual return data and the results of actual IRS audits conducted as part of the 1979
IRS Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), Clotfelter (1983) attempts to
explain underreported income as a function of effective marginal tax rates, after-tax income,
wages as a proportion of adjusted gross income, interest and individuals as a proportion of
adjusted gross income, and several socio-economic variables. But Clotfelter ignores audit rates
because of potential simultaneity problems, and constructs a measure of the effective marginal
tax rate, based on taxpayer return characteristics and the relevant marginal state income tax rate,
which is both ad hoc and itself potentially endogenous. Thus, even though Clotfelter finds a
negative relationship between his measure of the effective marginal tax rate and compliance, we
regard his results as far from conclusive.
Alexander and Feinstein (1986), using 1982 TCMP data, also find negative effects of marginal 
tax rates on compliance. Tax rates enter in their model through the probability of detection. 
Their equation for the latter is assumed to be independent of their compliance equation, which 
leads them to estimate a recursive rather than simultaneous system. Their approach is therefore 
analogous to treating audit rates exogenously and therefore suffers the same criticism of the 
earlier aggregate studies. In addition, Alexander and Feinstein's analysis ignores the role of 
state taxation which we have demonstrated here to be an important detenninant of Federal 
compliance. 
18. Even though the Tax Administration Trust Fund was not included in the 1986 Tax Refonn Act,
it now appears IRS enforcement efforts are on the rise. In fact, the IRS recently has projected
an audit rate of 1.47 percent for fiscal year 1987, based on the employment of an additional
2,500 auditors (L.A. Times, April 16, 1987).
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